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...the way the Dutch system transmits capital market
pressures to incumbent management does not resemble
any of the better known governance models...
OECD (1996, p. 85)
1. Introduction
The critical control roles played by investor protections and concentrated
ownership has been the focus of much recent work in corporate governance. Some
very interesting but equally controversial conclusions have been generated based
largely on cross-country comparisons. This paper continues to investigate these
two mechanisms of corporate control, but offers a within-country analysis of Dutch
firms.
The Netherlands offers a splendid environment in which to study control
issues. Several unique devices exist for circumscribing investor protections, and
they are used by many, but not all, firms. Ownership concentration also ranges
widely, and different types of owners can be identified. Voting rights and cash
flow rights have differing effects on firms, with the former providing the means
for control and the latter the motivation. We are able to assesses the impact of
these different rights on firm performance. Dutch firms are also constrained by an
interesting set of networks among individuals sitting on the boards of firms and
financial intermediaries. These networks may provide an additional channel of
control. Importantly, the extent to which these unique control mechanisms are
used varies greatly among firms, thus enhancing identification of their impact on
behavior. Coupled with an active stock market, a very stable macroeconomy in the2
1990s, and high quality data, the Netherlands provides an unusually rich
environment in which to learn about the effectiveness of a wide variety of
corporate control mechanisms.
Apart from substantive contributions, the paper also develops a new
approach to the reverse causation problem plaguing econometric studies of
corporate control mechanisms and firm performance. In these studies, there is the
salient possibility that the corporate controls may themselves be responsive to the
factors determining firm performance. This potential endogeneity calls into
question econometric equations using corporate control variables as regressors.
We develop a four-step estimation strategy for generating consistent coefficient
estimates and the associated standard errors.
Section 2 considers the relations among information and incentive
asymmetries, control mechanisms, and firm performance. We begin with the well-
known agency problem between managers and owners emphasized by Berle and
Means. We then consider the underinvestment that may occur when firms face
constraints for external funds. The analysis is broadened to include the additional
constraint imposed by equity investors that generates additional incentives for
management to underinvest in physical capital (as emphasized in models of
myopia) or human capital (as emphasized by Allen and Gale (2000) and Burkart,
Gromb, and Panunzi (1997)). Management/owner conflicts, financing constraints,
and managerial underinvestment each stem from information and incentive
asymmetries, and each may lower profitability. The extent of this adverse effect is
related to corporate control mechanisms.
Section 3 discusses the important characteristics of the Dutch system of
corporate control comprising three constituencies -- financiers, institutions, and
corporate managers. The roles of Networks as a means for controlling managers3
and of Administrative Offices as a means for separating voting and cash flow
rights are discussed, as well as additional devices by which managers can dilute
shareholder influence.
Section 4 provides a detailed discussion of the data. We have financial
statement data and corporate control characteristics, including separate measures
of voting and cash flow rights, for 112 Dutch firms for the period 1992-1997.
Section 5 develops our four-step estimation strategy that accounts for the
possible endogeneity between corporate controls and firm performance. The first
step estimates a panel model, and extracts a fixed effect composed of corporate
control and other influences. The second step isolates the impact of the corporate
control variable in a cross-section regression. In the third step, the potentially
distorting effects of reverse causation are controlled for in a Probit regression
using appropriate instruments. The fourth and final step adjusts the standard errors
for the regressors generated in the third step.
Section 6 reports on four initial findings. First, a substantial role of a
controlling shareholder in ameliorating corporate governance problems is not
sustained; we find some weak evidence that performance is enhanced for firms
with a controlling shareholder. Second, the identity of ownership matters. When a
firm is controlled by a few large and individual shareholders, firm performance
suffers, and expropriation costs appear to be very high for this type of investor.
Third and somewhat at odds with the bulk of the prevailing literature, performance
is enhanced when the firm is freed of equity market constraints. These results are
consistent with recent theoretical models emphasizing that too much oversight can
be detrimental to performance by forcing firms to underinvest in physical or
human capital. Fourth, considering both voting and cash flow rights proves
important for the empirical results. Voting rights provides the means for4
intervening in firm affairs; cash flow rights the required motivation.
Section 7 contains a summary and conclusions.5
2. Impediments To Firm Performance
Information asymmetries among managers, investors, and creditors can
affect firm performance in several different ways. This section discusses some of
the models in the literature, and highlights that firm performance does not increase
monotonically with tighter corporate controls.
One consequence of information asymmetries is the well-known Berle-
Means agency problem. The incentives of managers controlling the firm differ
from those of owners and, in large publicly held corporations, most
owners/investors have little incentive to expend resources to ensure that the firm is
operated in their interests. Jensen (1986) emphasizes that these agency problems
are likely to become particularly severe when managers have an abundance of
internal resources relative to investment opportunities (i.e., "Free Cash Flow").
Various mechanisms exist to attenuate incentive conflicts and narrow the distance
between the objectives of managers and owners. Nonetheless, corporate control
problems will not be fully resolved, and managers' interests in expanding the size
of and keeping resources within the firm will not be fully kept in check. The
important consequence is that the Berle-Means agency problem may lead
overinvestment and poor performance.
Information asymmetries can also lead to underinvestment for several
reasons. First, when creditors have less information about a firm and its
investment prospects, they will demand a premium for extending finance.
1
Consequently, the cost of external funds will exceed that for internal funds, and
investment may be retarded. Projects with a positive net present value (calculated
1 Among the manyimportant papers on the topic of finance constraints, see Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), Myers and Majluf (1983), Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Gertler (1988), and
Hubbard (1998).6
with respect to the rate on internal funds) will not be undertaken. Financing
problems increase and overall firm performance decreases with the extent of
information asymmetries. Second, underinvestment may also arise because of
managerial shirking. In the model of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), managers
forgo profitable projects that have net private costs to managers. These costs are
generated in their model by the increased oversight due to the new investment
project. Asymmetric information precludes investors from gaining a full
appreciation of managerial behavior. Third, the "Managerial Myopia" model
argues that equity markets may not allocate capital efficiently because of an
absence of stable, dedicated investors with a long-term interest in the firm's
performance. Information asymmetries lead investors to emphasize immediate,
measurable investment returns when allocating capital.
2 Rather than being
ameliorative, equity market pressure management into an undue focus on boosting
short-term earnings and avoiding takeover threats at the expense of long-run
performance.
This model of managerial myopia has not received as much attention as
those for finance and free cash flow problems, but is fully consistent with
optimizing behavior. Models of strategic behavior establish that, when inside
managers know more about the firm's operations than outside owners, high hurdle
rates can occur because of a premium for signal jamming, obfuscation, or hidden
action.
3 As one example of this class of models, consider the "Signal Jamming"
2 For discussions of capital allocation systems suffering from short-termism, see De Jong (1996)
for the Netherlands, Daniels and Morck (1995) for Canada, and Hayes and Abernathy (1980),
Grundfest (1990), and Porter (1992) for the United States.
3 See Narayanan (1985), Stein (1989), Webb (1993), and Bebchuk and Stole (1993) for formal
models and Bohlin (1997) for an excellent surveyof managerial incentives and investment biases.7
model of Stein (1989) in which there exists a Nash equilibrium between managers
and stock market investors. Investors value earnings as a signal, and know that
firms recognize the value of the earnings signal. Firms thus have an incentive to
increase earnings by undertaking actions invisible to outsiders (i.e., firms jam the
earnings signal). The firm and investors qua owners are in a classic prisoners
dilemma. The stock market is efficient, but firms nonetheless act myopically. Not
undertaking profitable investment projects is one of the invisible actions adversely
affecting firm performance. From a different perspective, Shleifer and Vishny
(1990) examine arbitragers' incentives. They argue that arbitrage in long-term
assets is more expensive relative to short-term assets. Consequently, in
equilibrium, serious and sustained mispricing is more likely to affect long-term
assets, which tend to fund long-term projects. Since managers wish to avoid
mispricing of their equity, they will favor assets and projects with shorter horizons.
The important implication of these models is that "[S]hielded from short-term
stock-market pressure and the risk of hostile takeovers, management can develop a
long-term view" (CPB, p. 380).
Two recent studies have emphasized that tight shareholder controls can be
detrimental to firm performance through managers' reluctance to invest in the firm.
In somewhat similar frameworks, Allen and Gale (2000) and Burkart, Gromb, and
Panunzi (1997) develop models in which managers hesitate to make firm-specific
human capital investments in environments with controlling owners who may
subsequently extract the rents from ex-post vulnerable managers. Looser controls,
perhaps through a reduction in investor protections, partly resolves this problem,
and thus benefit firm performance.
In sum, free cash flow, finance, and/or myopia problems hurt performance.
Importantly, better corporate control may not lead to better performance. To8
obtain a better understanding of the relation among control and performance, we
consider several control mechanisms in our empirical work. Before turning to
econometric issues and estimation results, we review the Dutch corporate control
system.9
3. The Dutch System Of Corporate Governance
Figure 1 depicts the system of corporate control comprising three
constituencies: financiers and institutions that seek to oversee corporate
managers.
4 The focal point of this system is a two-tier board structure consisting
of a management board (Raad van Bestuur) in charge of the day-to-day
operations of the firm and a supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen). The
supervisory board's scope of influence varies substantially depending on which
organizational regime the firm adopts. The structural regime (Structuurregeling)
described here applies to the majority of public limited liability companies
(Naamloze Vennootschappen, NV's) listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange.
(Further discussion of legal regimes is provided in Section II.B.) The supervisory
board has three primary functions: to appoint (usually for an indefinite term),
monitor, and dismiss members of the management board (though the latter rarely
occurs);
5 draft the annual financial statement for presentation at the annual
shareholders meeting; and approve major business decisions proposed by the
management board concerning, for example, expansions, acquisitions,
restructurings, or financing.
Members of the supervisory board are appointed for four year terms by co-
4 Detailed descriptions of the system of corporate control and finance in the Netherlands can be
found in CPB (1997, Chapter 10), Gelauff and den Broeder (1997), and de Jong, Kabir, Marra, and
Röell (1998). We have relied particularly heavilyon Gelauff and den Broeder's work in writing this
section.
5 Dutch management board turnover, calculated as the number of management board members
leaving the firm by other than natural causes and scaled by board size, is approximately 8.0% (Van
Oijen, 2000). This figure is somewhat low compared to those reported for other countries; Kaplan
(1994) reports turnover rates of 12.0% (excluding cases of death and illness) for the United States
and 10.0% for Germany.10
option, that is, by the incumbent members of the supervisory board.
6 An
individual can not serve on both the supervisory and management boards of the
same company. In practice, the management board has a very large influence on
appointments to the supervisory board (van der Goot and van het Kaar, 1997);
hence the two-way arrows of influence between the supervisory and management
boards in Figure 1. The two-tier board structure in the Netherlands differs
substantially from that in Germany, where the supervisory board is appointed by
the shareholders at the annual meeting and exerts substantial independent
influence on management. The close relations between management and
supervisory boards makes the Dutch two-tier system somewhat similar to the U.S.
system, where executive managers sit on the board of directors (comparable to the
supervisory board) and the chief executive officer often chairs the board of
directors. In sum, the Dutch supervisory board is largely advisory, though that
counsel may receive more attention depending on the background of the advising
member.
Voting rights exercised at the annual meeting of shareholders (Algemene
Vergadering van Aandeelhouders) are largely circumscribed by the structural
regime in two ways. First, few important issues come before the annual meeting:
the financial statement drafted by the supervisory board is voted on (amendments
are not permitted), nominations for the supervisory board may be proposed and
rejected, though election is by incumbent members of the supervisory board.
Second and more devastating to investors' voting rights, management has available
several potent devices for diluting voting power and separating control rights from
cash flow rights (discussed in Section II.B). Shareholders have little reason to
6 The mean [median] number of members on the supervisory and management boards for our
sample of firms is 4.95 [5] and 2.95 [3], respectively.11
pursue aggressively their limited tasks granted under the structural regime. The
Dutch annual meeting differs radically from its German and U.S. counterparts,
where, in principle, shareholders have a powerful effect on the course of events
primarily by electing the supervisory board (or board of directors) and voting on
important matters brought before shareholders. However, German annual
meetings are controlled by the large banks, who amass a vast number of votes
either directly through ownership or indirectly through proxies, borrowings, or
bank-controlled investment companies. In considering voting rights in the
Netherlands, it is important to bear in mind that investor protections and the tasks
voted upon at the annual meeting are directly linked to the applicable
organizational regime. Under other organizational regimes available to Dutch
firms, shareholders exercise much more influence.
Diluted voting power also cripples both large and small shareholders,a n d
hostile takeovers do not succeed in the Netherlands. In Figure 1, the lines
connecting large and small shareholders to voting rights and voting rights to the
management and supervisory boards represent weak, nearly non-existent, channels
of influence. However, large shareholders representing either organizations
(especially financial) and or individuals have some success in securing
appointments to the supervisory board.
The separation of cash flow and control rights is particularly stark with the
establishment of an administrative office (Administratie-kantoor, AK) that issues
tradable depository receipts (TDR's). Under this procedure, the ordinary equity
capital is deposited at an AK, and TDR's are issued (similar to American
Depository Receipts issued on no-U.S. equity). TDR's entitle the holder to cash
flow rights; however, control rights reside with the AK. This anti-investor
protection device is used by 32.0% of the firms in our sample, and will be an12
important part of our empirical analysis.
Financial Intermediaries also hold equity positions and, as discussed
above, shareownership per se has little impact on controlling managers. However,
their equity stakes are occasionally large, and they are considered long-term,
"patient" investors. Consequently, financial intermediaries frequently obtain seats
on the supervisory board.
7 Furthermore, banks are actively involved in extending
short-term credit, and thus have a direct and potentially powerful channel of
influence on management (cf. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Section IV.C). The role
of Dutch banks is much greater than in the United States, where banks are largely
prohibited from owning equity and, until very recently, were small by the
standards of Continental Europe. By contrast, banks have a long-standing and
prominent role on the corporate landscape in Germany where they hold large
positions in both debt and equity and actively serve on, and frequently chair,
supervisory boards.
Employees are represented by a works council (Ondernemings-raad), which
is voluntary but in force at virtually all large firms. The works council has some
influence with and occasional membership on the supervisory board, where
usually one member represents workers' concerns. The works council has the
same rights as shareholders to propose or reject nominations to the supervisory
board. The position of the works councils bear some resemblance to that played
by organized labor in the United States, where union representatives frequently
hold a seat on the board of directors. By contrast, legal statutes grant German
workers much more nominal influence on corporate affairs, including between
7 Pension funds and insurance companies own more equity in the Netherlands than Germany
(13.4% vs. 7.1%) but much less than their U.S. counterparts (24.7%). (Data are for 1993, and are
taken from Gelauff and den Broeder, 1997, p. 46).13
one-third to one-half of the seats on the supervisory board.
8 However, the chair of
the German supervisory board holds the tie-breaking vote, and this position is
usually held by a person (frequently a banker) sympathetic to management's
concerns.
Inside (managerial) ownership of listed firms is unimportant in the
Netherlands. de Jong et. al. (1998, Table 10) provide data on inside ownership by
members of the management and supervisory boards (for 1996). Based on an
ownership criterion of 20.0%, 13 of the 137 firms were controlled by insiders
sitting on the management board and an additional four for those on the
supervisory board. Six of these companies have insiders with majority ownership;
in five cases, the control is fully within the management board.
Lastly but potentially important for control, members of the supervisory
board are frequently Outside Board Members. These individuals hold positions
on the management and supervisory boards of other companies or are
"distinguished experts" drawn from the ranks of politicians, civil servants, lawyers,
professors, and former directors. We are particularly interested in relations
between financial institutions and firms, and focus on their board members who
create informal networks by sitting on both boards.
In sum, Dutch managers are pressured by several mechanisms of control that
affect firms to differing extents. For firms organized under the structural regime,
investor protections are devastated, and the influence of equity stakes of whatever
size is severely curtailed. The behavior of these firms "liberated" from investor
influence will highlight the effectiveness of other control mechanisms. First,
8 German co-determination laws require that, for stock companies with 500 or more employees,
one-third of the seats on the supervisoryboard must be held by persons elected by the employees.
The fraction increases to one-half for stock companies with 2,000 or more employees.14
institutional mechanisms may be put in place that force firms to disgorge cash, and
hence lessen the incidence of agency problems. Second, banks may exercise
control via the extension of short-term credit. Third, financial intermediaries with
large equity stakes, other large shareholders, and outsiders board members may
gain influence by obtaining seats on the supervisory board. These latter two
channels of influence are consistent with the composition of supervisory boards for
Dutch and German firms reported in Table 1. Measured by the number of seats on
the supervisory board, Dutch firms are as much bank-influenced as those in
Germany, the prototypical bank-based economy. The potential influence of
financial intermediaries, large shareholders, and informal networks is evident, as
53.0% of supervisory board seats are held by representatives of these groups. By
examining the performance of a broad cross-section of Dutch firms, we will be
able to assess the impacts of various control mechanisms on corporate behavior.15
4. The Dataset
We draw on three sources to construct the variables used in our econometric
analysis. Our sample extends from 1992-1997, unless otherwise noted. Financial
statement data are obtained from the AMADEUS/REACH database covering 165
Dutch firms. We focus on firms involved in manufacturing, omitting financial and
service firms. Since the data will be time-averaged to form the cross-section used
in the econometric work, a balanced panel is required.
9 Thus, we omit firms
involved in mergers or takeovers (which are extremely rare). Royal Dutch Shell is
excluded because it is not fully registered in the Netherlands. Based on financial
statement data, we have 128 firms, and the following data definitions:
CVCFA = cash flow, equal to operating income plus
depreciation, divided by TA;
FIXED = material assets less depreciation all divided by TA;
LEVERAGE = TA less stockholders equity all divided by TA.
PROFITABILITY = the return on assets equal to before-tax profits plus
financial expenses divided by TA;
SIZE = the natural logarithm of TA;
TA = total assets less depreciation;
Data for variables describing governance characteristics are obtained from
the Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance (1998). Ownership data were
9For those series analyzed as ratios, the ratios are computed and then summed over time; that is,
ratioi = Σt (ai,t /b i,t). All of the ratios are defined so that bi,t is far from zero. This procedure obviates
the need for price deflators, which are unavailable on a firm-specific basis.16
not available for the 16 firms, and thus our dataset is reduced to 112 firms:
AKmm = is an indicator variable equaling one if at least
mm% of the voting [cash flow] rights are held by
an administrative office (Administratie-kantoor);
LARGESTmm = is an indicator variable equaling one if the largest
shareholder holds at least mm% of the voting rights
or cash flow rights, 0 elsewise;
LISmm = is an indicator variable equaling one for large
individual shareholders (LIS), those shareholders
who are 1) individuals (not organizations), 2) who
hold at least 5% of the voting [cash flow] rights,
and 3) who collectively hold at least mm% of the
voting [cash flow] rights, 0 elsewise;
LISTING = an indicator variable equal to one when the firm
has been listed on the stock exchange since 1984,
0 elsewise;
NMB = the number of seats on the management board;
NSB = the number of seats on the supervisory board;
NON-FRENCH = is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm
is majority owned by a foreign investor and this
investor is headquartered in a country that does not
follow the French legal tradition as determined by
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998).
Informal networks are determined from the Jaarboek van Nederlandse17
Ondernemingen.
10 Based on this information on board composition, we are able to
trace through the relations between firms and financial intermediaries as follows:
NETWORKS = is an indicator variable equal to one if 1) a firm's
supervisory board contains a member(s) of the
management board of a financial intermediary or
2) a member of the management board of the firm
sits on a financial intermediary's supervisory board,
or 3) a firm's supervisory board contains a
member(s) of the supervisory board of a financial
intermediary, 0 elsewise;
Summary statistics for the means, medians, and standard deviations for the
above variables are presented in Table 2.
10 Note that one of the "Big Three" Dutch banks, the RABObank, is a co-operative, and network
data are obtained from its annual reports for 1992-1997.18
5. The Four-Step Estimation Strategy
The fundamental problem plaguing econometric studies of corporate control
mechanisms and firm performance is the salient possibility that the corporate
controls may themselves be responsive to the factors determining firm
performance. This potential endogeneity calls into question econometric equations
using corporate control variables as regressors. In this section, we build on prior
work by Hsaio (1986), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), and Lehmann and
Weigand (2000), and develop our four-step estimation strategy for generating
consistent estimates of the sensitivity of firm performance to various corporate
control variables and the associated standard errors.
Before describing that procedure, we begin by noting that the ultimate aim
of our estimation strategy is a cross-section analysis of the relation between
corporate control mechanisms and firm profitability. The questions motivating
this study focus on long-run relations. Since there is variation in both the cross-
section and time dimensions, one is tempted to exploit all of this variation by
pooling the data and estimating a fixed-effects model. Two reasons suggest
resisting this temptation. First, since corporate control mechanisms change very
little over our available time period, behavioral responses can be identified only in
the cross-section.
11 Second, using the available time variation would necessitate
specifying the temporal dynamics of the balance sheet variables. While these
dynamics are interesting in their own right, they raise specification issues that may
bias estimates of the parameters of interest in this study. For example, if firms
smooth earnings, then annual earnings will be a misleading measure of period t
profitability; the averaging procedure used here is unaffected by this intertemporal
11 We have verified that there is little time-series variation in the corporate control variables in
our dataset.19
distortion. Several of these points have been considered formally by Pesaran and
Smith (1995) in a random coefficients framework with exogenous regressors.
These authors establish three important properties of coefficients estimated from a
cross-section model: 1) they represent the long-run average effects; 2) they are
consistent for large T; and 3) they are robust to misspecification of dynamics in the
underlying micro model. Furthermore, even when the model is correctly specified,
they show that the fixed-effects model generates inconsistent estimates. Thus,
several considerations suggest that the cross-section relation between corporate
control variables and firm performance is the ultimate goal.
5.1. Extracting The Compound Fixed Effect
We begin with the following econometric equation that relates performance
(π i,t) of firm i at time t to a set of explanatory variables (represented here by the
scalar variable Xi,t) and, of most interest to this study, a corporate control variable
(CCi) that does not vary over time. Additionally, we assume that firm profitability
is influenced by a fixed effect (α i) and a stochastic disturbance (ei,t). These
considerations lead to the following panel model for firm performance,
π i,t = α i + β Xi,t + γ  CCi +e i,t ,( 1 )
where β and γ are parameters to be estimated. The object of our analysis is γ ,
which can not be estimated in a standard fixed effects model because its regressor,
CCi, does not vary in the time dimension and, hence, γ  is not identifiable given the
α i's. Nonetheless, we can estimate their total effect with a pooled version of (1)
rewritten as follows,20
π i,t = δ i + β Xi,t +e i,t ,( 2 a )
  δ i ≡ α i + γ  CCi . (2b)
Equation (2b) contains the fixed effect and the corporate control variable.
Following Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), we assume that the
endogeneity between ei,t and Xi,t is captured by the α i in δ i. With this assumption,
consistent estimates of β are obtained by removing the time-means from the
dependent and independent variables in (2), and running the following regression,
π
#
i,t = β X
#
i,t +e i,t ,( 3 )
where the # superscript represents deviations from time-means. Finally, we
extract the compound fixed effect (Yi) by taking time-means (MEAN[.]) of the
t e r m si n( 2 )a n du s i n gt h eβ estimated from (3) to the fixed effect,
Yi ≡ δ i +e i, =M E A N [ π i,t]-β MEAN[Xi,t], ( 4 )
where ei equals MEAN[ei,t].
5.2. Isolating The Impact Of Corporate Control
The observable Yi is a collection of three effects that vary only in the cross-
sectional dimension: the firm fixed effect (α i), the mean of profitability shocks
(ei), and the corporate control variable (CCi). To isolate the impact of corporate
control, we run the following cross-section regression containing dummies for J
industries (INDUSTRYj) and a specific measure of the corporate control variable,21
Yi = φ 0 + φ j INDUSTRYj + γ CCi +u i,( 5 )
where ui is an error term. Estimates of γ in (5) will be consistent only if the
corporate control variable is orthogonal to the profitability effects captured in ui.
The possibility of a correlation suggests that we need to search for a set of
instruments to neutralize the influence of profitability on corporate control.
5.3. Controlling For Reverse Causation
Our approach to ensuring that reverse causation does not affect our
estimated γ is to search for instruments (Zi) that will be correlated with the
corporate control variable but be reasonably expected to be uncorrelated with
profitability. We choose longevity as measured by whether the firm has been
listed on the stock exchange for several years (LISTING), the size of the firm
(SIZE), and the number of members on the managerial (NMB) and supervisory
boards (NSB). Following recent arguments in the law and finance literature, we
also include an indicator variable for those firms with foreign owners
headquartered in countries with strong legal protections (NON-FRENCH). Since
all of our corporate control variables are dichotomous, we run the following probit
regressions,
CCi = PROBIT[Z' Λ ]+w i (6)
where Λ is a vector of estimated parameters, wi is an error term, and Zi =
{LISTINGi,N
MB
i,N
SB
i,N O N - F R E N C H i,S I Z E i,C O N S T A N T } .
Regression results for shareholders with a stake in excess of 40% of voting22
rights, cash flow rights, and the intersection of voting and cash flow rights are
presented in Table 3. The coefficients and their individual significance are not of
immediate importance. The estimated values of CCi share the property with the
Z's that they are orthogonal to profitability shocks, and hence we estimate (5) with
the fitted PROBIT values,
Yi = φ 0 + φ j INDUSTRYj + γ PROBIT[Z' Λ ]+ u i.( 7 )
Equation (7) generates a consistent estimate of γ,  which is the key objective of our
analysis.
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5.4. Correcting The Standard Errors
While the coefficient estimates are consistent, the standard errors from the
software package fail to recognize that the regressors have been generated. The
associated incremental variation is not incorporated in the computation of the
standard errors. This correction can be easily implemented by replacing the
estimated values with the actual values in (7) where the φ 's and γ are estimated
consistently and recomputing the standard error (SE[.]) of ui,
SE[ui]= S E [ Y i - φ 0 - φ j INDUSTRYj - γ CCi]. (8)
The correct standard errors are obtained by multiplying the standard errors from
the computer package by the value in (8) and dividing by the standard error of ui
12 The impact of reverse causation can be assessed by a Hausman test by comparing the efficient
but potentially inconsistent OLS estimate of γ to the four-step estimate. These computations will
be undertaken in future work.23
computed from (7). This correction substantially raises the standard errors, and
hence makes it more difficult to find statistically significant γ 's.24
6. Empirical Results
This section presents initial results based on our four-step estimation
strategy. The several regressions required by this approach "burn-up" a substantial
amount of information in the dataset, and thus makes inference difficult using
conventional significance levels. Consequently, we expand the cutoff for
determining statistical significance to 20%. The discussion of impediments to
firm performance in Section 2 indicates that any hypothesis test must be two-sided.
Statistical tests of the null hypothesis that a coefficient is zero is only one
way to significance. In future work, we will translate the coefficients estimated in
the four-step procedure into statements about the economic impacts on
profitability.
6.1. Dominant Shareholder
Concentrating ownership in the hands of a single owner has two contrasting
effects on firm performance. It can be seen as a direct solution to the governance
problems that arise from the separation of ownership from control. With a
sufficiently large equity stake in the firm, investors have incentives to invest
resources in monitoring and disciplining managers and hence reducing information
problems and the associated agency costs. Alternatively, the controlling
shareholder may exploit its powerful position, and expropriate resources from the
firm in terms of direct (e.g., compensation) or indirect benefits (e.g. favorable
arrangements with companies in which the controlling shareholder has a beneficial
interest).
We investigate the importance of these monitoring and expropriation roles
of concentrated ownership with the four-step estimates presented in Table 3, Panel
A. In order to find a sufficient amount of data to meet our inclusion criterion (see25
the foot to Table 4), we had to raise the cutoff value for the ownership stakes to
40%. There is some evidence that concentrated levels of voting rights are
associated with better performance. However, the estimated impact is much lower
for concentrated cash flow rights. When we form the intersection of the dominant
shareholder holding both voting rights and cash flow rights at a 40% cutoff, the
regression results indicate that performance rises, but the change is not statistically
significant. Thus, we uncover some weak evidence in support of the monitoring
role of concentrated ownership by the dominant owner.
6.2. Large Individual Shareholders (LIS)
The identity of ownership may matters. The incentive to expropriate may be
more pronounced for large individual shareholders. We are able to identify this
class of owners, which we define as those shareholders who are 1) individuals (not
organizations), 2) who hold at least 5% of the voting [cash flow] rights, and 3)
who collectively hold at least mm% of the voting [cash flow] rights, where mm%
is the cutoff value.
Coefficient estimates are presented in Panel B of Table 4 for all four cutoff
values of 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%. Concentrated rights uniformly lead to lower
profitability. The economic impact of concentrated voting rights is larger than that
for concentrated cash flow rights, and are statistically significant for the 10% and
20% cutoff values. Cash flow rights are statistically significant for the 10%, 20%,
and 40% cutoff values.
LIS' that have large voting rights usually have large cash flow rights. The
one exception is LIS10 where two firms that have large individual owners as
measured by voting rights do not have large individual owners measured by cash
flow rights. Thus, the results for the intersection of VR and CR in column 3 are26
very similar to the results for VR in column 1. We conclude that, when a firm is
controlled by a few large and individual shareholders, firm performance suffers.
Expropriation costs are very high for this large individual investors.
6.3. Administrative Office (AK)
Administrative offices are a particularly effective way for the managers of
the firm to separate voting and cash flow rights. Since the AK's are controlled by
the firm, managers can insulate themselves from shareholders' concerns.
Panel C of Table 4 contains the estimated sensitivity of performance to this
corporate control mechanism. For those firms with AK's controlling substantial
amounts of voting rights, performance is enhanced, but the increment is not
statistically significant. However, as shown in Column 3, when these voting rights
are combined with cash flow rights, the positive impact on profitability is much
larger and statistically significant. Freed from the constraints of intrusive
shareholders, managers appear to be able to increase profitability substantially.27
7. Summary And Conclusions
This paper uses the interesting institutional features in the Dutch economy
to undertake a within country test of the role of various corporate control
mechanisms. Four conclusions emerge. First, a substantial role of a controlling
shareholder in ameliorating corporate governance problems is not sustained. We
found some weak evidence that performance was enhanced for firms with a
controlling shareholder.
Second, the identity of ownership matters. When a firm is controlled by a
few large and individual shareholders, firm performance suffers. Expropriation
costs are very high for this type of investor.
Third, and somewhat at odds with the bulk of the prevailing literature,
performance is enhanced when the firm is freed of equity market constraints.
These results are consistent with the recent theoretical literature that too much
oversight can be detrimental in forcing firms to make myopic investment decisions
and for managers to forego investing in firm-specific human capital. This dark
side of equity markets has received too little attention in the corporate governance
literature.
Fourth, considering both voting and cash flow rights proved important.
Voting rights provides the means for intervening in firm affairs; cash flow rights
the required motivation. The AD's are an effective mechanism for collecting
voting rights. However, voting rights do not give the AD's any motivation for
assisting in firm performance. When coupled with cash flow rights, the
controlling AD's enhance performance.
Many questions remain. What are the economic impacts of these various
control mechanisms on profitability? What are the underlying forces at work in
determining the choice of corporate control mechanisms? These and related28
questions will be explored in future work.29
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Data Appendix
The sample of 112 firms used in this study was drawn from the following 128
firms for which we were able to obtain financial statement data. Ownership data
were not available for the 16 firms marked with a #, and hence they were excluded
from the sample used in this study. There is no obvious set of common
characteristics for these excluded firms.
1 AALBERTS INDUSTRIES
2 AHOLD KONINKLYKE
3 AHREND KONINKLYKE
4A I RH O L D I N G S
5 AKZO NOBEL
6 ALANHERI
7 AMSTERDAM RUBBER CULTUUR MAATSCHAPPY #
8 ARTU BIOLOGICALS #
9 ASM INTERNATIONAL
10 ATAG HOLDING
11 ATHLON GROEP
12 BALLAST NEDAM
13 BAM GROEP KONINKLYKE #
14 BATENBURG BEHEER
15 BEERS
16 BETER BED HOLDING #
17 BLYDENSTEIN WILLINK
18 BOER UNIGRO
19 BOLSWESSANEN KONINKLYKE
20 BOSKALIS WESTMINSTER
21 BRUNEL INTERNATIONAL
22 BURGMAN HEYBROEK
23 CAP GEMINI
24 CATE KONINKLYKE
25 CETECO
26 CINDU INTERNATIONAL
27 CONTENT BEHEER
28 CROWN GELDER PAPIERFABRIEKEN #
29 CSM
30 DELFT INSTRUMENTS
31 DICO INTERNATIONAL
32 DORP DESPEC GROEP
33 DRAKA HOLDING
34 DRIE ELECTRONICS BEHEER
35 DSM38
Data Appendix (continued)
36 ECONOSTO KONINKLYKE
37 ELSEVIER
38 EMBA #
39 EMIS EUROPEAN MARKETING INFORMATION SERVICES
40 ERIKS HOLDING
41 FLEXOVIT INTERNATIONAL
42 FREE RECORD SHOP HOLDING
43 FUGRO
44 GAMMA HOLDING
45 GELDERSE PAPIERGROEP
46 GETRONICS
47 GEVEKE
48 GOUDA VUURVAST HOLDING
49 GROLSCH
50 GRONTMY
51 GROOTHANDELSGEBOUWEN
52 GTI HOLDING
53 HAGEMEYER
54 HEINEKEN
55 HELVOET HOLDING
56 HES BEHEER
57 HEYMANS
58 HIM FURNESS
59 HOEKS MACHINE ZUURSTOFFABRIEK
60 HOLLAND COLOURS
61 HOLLANDSE BETON GROEP
62 HOOGOVENS KONINKLYKE
63 HUNTER DOUGLAS #
64 ICT AUTOMATISERING
65 IHC CALAND
66 INTERNATIO MULLER
67 KBB KONINKLYKE BYENKORF BEHEER
68 KLENE HOLDING
69 KONINKLYKE LUCHTVAART MAATSCHAPPY
70 KPN KONINKLYKE
71 KRASNAPOLSKY HOTELS RESTAURANTS
72 KUHNE HEITZ #
73 LANDRE MERREM KONINKLYKE
74 LCI COMPUTER GROUP #
75 LEER KONINKLYKE EMBALLAGE INDUSTRIE VAN39
Data Appendix (continued)
76 MAAS GROEP KONINKLYKE FRANS
77 MACINTOSH RETAIL GROUP
78 MANAGEMENT SHARE
79 MELLE #
83 NEDAP
84 NEDCON GROEP
85 NEDLLOYD KONINKLYKE
86 NEDSCHROEF HOLDING KONINKLYKE
87 NEWAYS ELECTRONICS INTERNATIONAL
88 NKF HOLDING
89 NORIT
90 OCE
91 OMMEREN KONINKLYKE
92 OPG APOTHEKERS COOPERATIE #
93 ORDINA BEHEER #
94 OTRA
95 P C GROEP
96 PAKHOED KONINKLYKE
97 PHILIPS ELECTRONICS KONINKLYKE
98 POLYGRAM
99 POLYNORM
100 PORCELEYNE FLES ANNO 1653 KONINKLYKE DELFTSC
101 RANDSTAD HOLDING
102 REESINK
103 ROOD TESTHOUSE INTERNATIONAL
104 ROTO SMEETS BOER
105 SAMAS GROEP
106 SCHUITEMA
107 SCHUTTERSVELD
108 SIMAC TECHNIEK
109 SLIGRO BEHEER
110 SMIT INTERNATIONALE
111 SMIT TRANSFORMATOREN NV
112 SPHINX GUSTAVSBERG KONINKLYKE
113 STORK
114 TELEGRAAF HOLDINGMAATSCHAPPY
115 TULIP COMPUTERS #
116 TWENTHE KONINKLYKE TEXTIELGROEP #
117 TWENTSCHE KABEL HOLDING40
Data Appendix (continued)
118 UBBINK KONINKLYKE
119 UNILEVER
120 VENDEX
121 VILENZO INTERNATIONAL
122 VNU
123 VOLKER WESSELS STEVIN KONINKLYKE
124 VREDESTEIN #
125 WEGENER ARCADE
126 WELNA
127 WEWELER
128 WOLTERS KLUWER41
Table 1
Supervisory Board Seats
The
Category Netherlands Germany
(1) (2)
Industrial Firms 36% 25
Distinguished Experts 26 15
Large Shareholders 14 --
Financial Intermediaries 13 11
Employee Representatives 11 49
100% 100%
________________________
Notes To Table 1:
Source: Gelauff and den Broeder, 1997, Table 8. The entries are the percentage of
seats held on supervisory boards in The Netherlands and Germany in 1984 and
1986, respectively. Distinguished Experts are drawn from the ranks of politicians,
civil servants, lawyers, professors, and former directors. For Germany, some of
the seats in the Distinguished Experts and Large Shareholders categories are
included in the Industrial Firms and Financial Intermediaries categories.42
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
A. Variables In The Profitability Regression
Standard
Variable Mean Median Deviation
PROFITABILITY 11.3 10.9 7.10
CVCFA 2.22 1.49 3.83
FIXED 3.71 3.60 1.91
LEVERAGE 5.99 6.14 1.53
B. Variables In The Probit Equation
Standard
Variable Mean Median Deviation
(1) (2) (3)
LISTING 0.545 1.000 0.500
N
MB 3.064 2.833 1.606
N
SB 5.052 2.167 1.924
NON-FRENCH 6.210 0.000 15.470
SIZE 5.626 5.626 0.78243
Table 2 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Notes To Table 2:
Data are from a stacked panel for 672 observations for 112 firms for the period
1992-1997. In Panel A, PROFITABILITY is the return on assets equal to before-
tax profits plus financial expenses divided by TA, where TA is total assets less
depreciation; CVCFA is cash flow, equal to operating income plus depreciation,
divided by TA; FIXED is material assets less depreciation all divided by TA;
LEVERAGE is TA less stockholders equity all divided by TA. In Panel B,
LISTING is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm has been listed on the
stock exchange since 1984, 0 elsewise; N
MB is the number of seats on the
management board; N
SB is the number of seats on the supervisory board; NON-
FRENCH is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm is majority owned by
a foreign investor and this investor is headquartered in a country that does not
follow the French legal tradition as determined by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); SIZE is the natural logarithm of TA.44
Table 3
Probit Estimates Of Equation (6)
Dependent Variable: LARGEST40 .
Voting Cash Flow
Rights Rights Intersection
VR CR (VR∩ CR) .
(1) (2) (3)
LISTING -0.098 -0.108
* -0.076
N
MB 0.006 0.036 0.037
N
SB -0.022 -0.005 -0.011
NON-FRENCH 0.002 0.011
** 0.007
**
SIZE 0.051 -0.037 -0.033
CONSTANT 0.051 -0.059 -0.074
Count R
2 0.652 0.804 0.786
N(obs=0) 30 81 82
N(obs=1) 82 31 30
_____________________
Notes To Table 3:
The parameter estimates are the marginal effects (dP/dx) conditional on Y=1,
where Y = {LARGEST40VR, LARGEST 40CR, LARGEST 40VR∩ CR} and Z are
instruments orthogonal to profitability shocks; Z = {LISTING, N
MB,N
SB,N O N -
FRENCH, SIZE, CONSTANT}. A ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and a
* denotes significance at the 20% level. Standard errors are computed from the
analytical derivatives. Count R
2 is the number of times the estimated model
generates a correct prediction relative to the total number of observations, where a
prediction is correct if the absolute value of the difference between the estimated
and actual values is less than 0.5 (Maddala, 2001, p. 329). N(obs=0) [N(obs=1)]
is the number of observations for which the dependent variable equals 0 [1].45
Table 4
Four-Step Estimates Of The Corporate Control Variable From
Equation (7)
Voting Cash Flow
Rights Rights Intersection
VR CR (VR∩ CR) .
(1) (2) (3)
A. Dominant Shareholder
LARGEST40 0.119 0.039 0.057
[0.196] [0.930] [0.321]
73% 28% 27%
B. Large Individual Shareholders (LIS)
LIS5 -0.042 -0.024 -0.042
[0.270] [0.376] [0.270]
50% 71% 50%
LIS10 -0.052 -0.039 -0.062
[0.155] [0.173] [0.106]
37% 51% 35%
LIS20 -0.100 -0.059 -0.100
[0.059] [0.096] [0.059]
25% 39% 25%
LIS40 -0.130 -0.103 -0.130
[0.212] [0.112] [0.212]
12% 19% 12%46
Table 4 (continued)
Four-Step Estimates Of The Corporate Control Variable From
Equation (7)
Voting Cash Flow
Rights Rights Intersection
VR CR (VR∩ CR) .
(1) (2) (3)
C. Administrative Office (AK)
AK5 0.086 0.126 0.116
[0.262] [0.145] [0.157]
49% 17% 16%
AK10 0.088 0.175 0.159
[0.353] [0.169] [0.186]
48% 16% 15%
AK20 0.088 0.199 0.185
[0.381] [0.175] [0.769]
47% 15% 14%
AK40 0.001 0.109 0.068
[0.990] [0.508] [0.569]
43% 13% 12%
D. Networks
To be computed in the next draft47
Table 4 (continued)
Four-Step Estimates Of The Corporate Control Variable From
Equation (7)
Notes To Table 4:
The estimates are computed using the four-step method developed in Section 3.
The table reports point estimates, p-values for a two-sided t-test of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, and the percentage of observations that
equal or exceed the cutoff value. The estimated model also includes a constant
and dummies for the following industries: chemicals, construction, consumer
goods, electronic, foods, information and communication technology, metal, paper,
publishers, retail, and services. The corporate governance variables appearing in
the table are selected as follows. The corporate governance variables are sorted
into contrasting classes based on cutoffs ranging from 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%.
For a given cutoff and corporate governance variable, the percentage of
observations for the 112 firms is represented by θ . Estimates are reported in the
table if the contrasting classes both have at least 15% of the sample; that is, 0.85 >
θ > 0.15 for either the voting rights or cash flow rights variable. For example, the
first row of the table shows that, based on a cutoff value of 40%, the dominant
shareholder in 73% of the firms holds at least 40% of the voting rights. Based on
the same cutoff, the dominant shareholder in 28% of the firms holds at least 40%
of the cash flow rights. Thus, the criterion is met by both the voting rights and
cash flow rights variables. When the cutoff value is lowered to 20%, the dominant
shareholder controls voting rights in excess of 20% in more than 85% of the firms,
and cash flow rights in excess of 20% in less than 15% of the firms. Thus, the
inclusion criteria for θ is not satisfied, and no results are reported in the table.